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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lance Tyrell Taylor appeals from the district court's order denying him
credit for time served as a condition of probation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Taylor pied guilty to one count of grand theft. (R., pp. 58-67). The district
court imposed but suspended a sentence of 10 years with two years determinate
and ordered Taylor to complete drug court. (R., pp. 73, 86-90.) Taylor was later
expelled from drug court and the district court revoked his probation.
123, 127-30. 1)

(R., pp.

The court awarded Taylor credit for 211 days served pre-

judgment and 81 days served after his arrest on the warrant for the probation
violation in its June 19, 2014 order. (R., pp. 127-29.)
On July 7, 2014, Taylor filed a pro se motion for credit for time served.
(R., p. 139.)

His counsel thereafter filed a motion to amend the judgment,

requesting credit for 227 days for incarceration from August 13, 2012 until March
27, 2013 and 107 days of post-judgment incarceration.

(R., pp. 143-44.) The

district court granted the motion to amend the judgment in part and denied it in
part.

(R., pp. 146-48.) Specifically, the court granted credit for the entire 107

days of post-judgment incarceration requested, but maintained the 211 days
credit for pre-judgment time served. (R., p. 152 (and 107 days for time served
"on the probation violation").)

The court entered its amended order revoking

At this time the district court also reduced the sentence to seven years with two
years determinate. (R., p. 128.)
1

1

probation, which included the new grant of credit for time served, on August 6,
2014. (R., p. 150.)
Taylor filed a second motion to amend the judgment on September 22,
2014, which is identical to the motion he filed on August 1, 2014 (including
another request for the 107 days post-judgment credit already granted), except
that it addends documents.

(R., pp. 158-65 (compare R., pp. 143-44).)

The_

district court concluded that Taylor was entitled to 226 days credit for time served
from August 13, 2012, the date of original arrest, until March 26, 2013, the date
of sentencing, and for 107 days post-judgment credit, entering its order on
November 24, 2014. (R., pp. 188-90.) Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp. 201-02.)
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ISSUES
Taylor states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred in its calculation of the credit for
time served to which Mr. Taylor was entitled.
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Taylor failed to show error in the district court's ruling on the motion to
amend the judgment?

2.

Has Taylor failed to show that amendments to Idaho statutes regarding
computation of credit for time served were intended by the Idaho
Legislature to be given retroactive effect?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Taylor Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling On The Motion To
Amend The Judgment
A.

Introduction
Taylor's motion to amend the judgment requested a total of 334 days

credit for time served, 227 days (from 8/13/12 to 3/27/13) for incarceration after
his arrest until his sentencing and 107 days (from 2/26/14 to 6/12/14) for
incarceration related to his probation violation.

(R., pp. 143-44, 158-65.) The

district court granted credit for 333 days (all but March 27, 2013). (R., pp. 18890.) On appeal Taylor claims he was entitled to credit for time served as drug
court sanctions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-20). This claim fails because it is not
preserved for appellate review and because Taylor has failed to show entitlement
to credit for time served.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous."
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).
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C.

Taylor Failed To Preserve The Claim For Credit For Time Served As Drug
Court Sanctions Because He Did Not Request This Credit In His Motions
To Amend The Judgment
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
In his motion to amend the judgment Taylor did not request credit for time
served at the order of the drug court. (R., pp. 143-44, 158-65.) The prosecution,
in responding to Taylor's second motion to amend, noted that Taylor had been
incarcerated as a sanction for drug court violations (R., pp. 175-76), but
specifically pointed out that such incarceration was not within the scope of the
pending motion (R., pp. 184 ("Mr. Taylor has not asked for credit towards his
sentence" for the drug court ordered incarcerations), 185 ("It is also telling that
Mr. Taylor does not request credit for those periods of incarceration.").)

The

district court denied Taylor's first motion for credit for time served on the basis
that it was not filed by counsel.

(R., p. 148.) Taylor has not challenged this

ruling. (Appellant's brief.) There is no ruling in the record on Taylor's second pro

se motion. Because Taylor did not include a request for credit for time served as
a result of drug court sanctions in his motion to amend the judgment, and has
further failed to claim fundamental error, he has failed to preserve this claim of
error for appellate review.
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D.

Taylor Was Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served As Sanctions For Drug
Court Violations
A criminal defendant "shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of

incarceration prior to the entry of judgment."

l.C. § 18-309.

In this case,

judgment was entered on March 26, 2013, when the court sentenced Taylor. (R.,
p. 73.) He was thus entitled to, and was given credit for, his incarceration from
his arrest on August 13, 2012 until entry of judgment and the start of probation on
March 26, 2013. (R., p. 189.)
"Generally, I.C. § 19-2603 governs credit for time served as it relates to
the revocation of probation." State v. Denny, 157 Idaho 217, 219, 335 P.3d 62,
64 (Ct. App. 2014); see also I.C. § 18-309 (when "the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from ... imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must be computed as part of" his
term of imprisonment). Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the time a defendant
is "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the
term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall count from
the date of service of [the] bench warrant." Thus, "[i]f a probationer has been
arrested for a probation violation, the defendant's incarceration from the time of
service of the bench warrant will count as part of the sentence." State v. Covert,
143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted).
Review of the record shows Taylor was granted full credit for time served from
his arrest on the charges underlying the probation violations.

(R., pp. 152

(granting the requested 107 days served "on the probation violation"), 189-90.)
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On appeal Taylor seeks credit for the time he was incarcerated on drug
court orders. He is not entitled to this credit for time served under I.C. § 18-309
because his sentence was still suspended at all relevant times. Likewise, he was
not arrested for a probation violation, and therefore not entitled to credit under
I.C. § 19-2603. Taylor has failed to show any statute under which he is entitled
to credit for time served as a drug court sanction.
Moreover, his claim that he was not subject to serving such sanctions
without credit for time served does not withstand scrutiny. At the sentencing
hearing at which probation was granted Taylor was provided several orders and
notices regarding drug court. The drug court advisory form instructed Taylor that
he could be sanctioned, including revocation of his own recognizance release, for
violating drug court rules, using controlled substances or alcohol, or tampering
with testing. (R., p. 78.) Taylor was also advised he could be "held without bond
for an indeterminate period of time" if he was "in violation of any condition of [his]

drug court agreement." (Id. (emphasis original).) Another order provided that if
Taylor violated conditions relating to drug court he could be "arrested and placed
in jail" and "subjected to other sanctions imposed by the court." (R., p. 84.) The
record shows that Taylor was held on drug court sanctions after his release and
before he was arrested for the probation violations. (R., pp. 161 (held in "temp
custody ... drug court"), 163 (held for contempt of drug court).)

Because any

time in jail between sentencing and his arrest for violating his probation was a
result of a drug court sanction (or related to a different case), Taylor has failed to
show he was entitled to credit for time served.

7

Taylor argues that time spent in custody as a result of drug court
sanctions should be applied to his credit for time served as a result of probation
violations because the terms of his probation did not directly provide for any
discretionary jail time as a condition of probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.)
The record, however, clearly establishes that the court ordered completion of
drug court as a condition of probation and the drug court notices clearly provided
that sanctions, including incarceration, could be imposed as a function of drug
court. (~, R., p. 78 ("I agree that the Court can revoke my ROR release and
impose sanctions for failing to comply with these conditions of release."); id. ("I
agree that I can be held without bond for an indeterminate period of time if I am
in violation of my drug court agreement." (emphasis original);

&

("I agree that I

will be sanctioned if I test positive for alcohol or any other illegal drug."); R., p. 84
("If you violate any of the above conditions, your bond or release on own

recognizance can be revoked, you can be arrested and placed in jail, and you
can be subjected to other sanctions imposed by the court.") (emphasis original));
R., p. 89 (imposing drug court completion as condition of probation)). Taylor's

argument that he was serving his sentence or was arrested on a probation
violation warrant or its equivalent is disproved by the record which shows he was
in custody on drug court sanctions.
The district court concluded that Taylor was not entitled to credit for time in
custody between sentencing and his arrest on probation violation allegations
because those times were the result of imposition of drug court sanctions. The
record supports the district court's ruling.
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11.
Taylor Has Failed To Show That Amendments To Idaho Statutes Regarding
Computation Of Credit For Time Served Should Be Given Retroactive Effect

A

Introduction
Taylor argues that the July 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-

2603 granting credit for time served as a condition of probation should be given
retroactive effect. 2

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-15.)

His argument-that the

legislature intended to render illegal all previously imposed sentences in which
credit for time served as a condition of probation was not granted-is meritless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

Taylor's Claim That The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 19-2603
Should Be Given Retroactive Effect Is Meritless
An Idaho statute "is not applied retroactively unless there is clear

legislative intent to that effect." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937-38, 318
P.3d 918, 927-28 (2014) (internal quotes omitted).

Such clear intent may be

found either by an express statement of retroactivity or in the language of the

The state notes that the entirety of the proceedings in the district court were
completed prior to the 2015 legislative session even starting (see R., p. 201
(notice of appeal filed 12/5/14)) and that but for Appellant's extensions of time the
briefing on this appeal would have been completed before the effective date of
the amendments upon which Taylor relies.
2
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statute requiring retroactive application.

19.:. at 938,

318 P.3d at 928. "A statute is

not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its
enactment" but is retroactive if it "changes the legal effect of previous
transactions or events." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d
636, 642 (2002). "When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of
the statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v.
Craven, 154 Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and
citation omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506
(2011).
In this case the district court awarded credit for time served in its June 19,
2014 order revoking probation. (R., pp. 127-29.) It amended the credit for time
served in response to two motions to correct an illegal sentence, entering these
orders on August 5, 2014 and November 24, 2014, respectively. (R., pp. 146,
188.)

Only this second order was appealed.

(R., p. 201.)

The legislature

passed amendments to the statutes governing credit for time served, effective
July 1, 2015. I.C. § 67-510. The amendments were thus passed well after the
court entered its orders.
The statutory language in the amendments shows that the legislature
intended the amendments to apply at the time the court calculated time served

upon imposing judgment. The amendment to I.C. § 18-309 provides:

10

In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered
or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original
withheld or suspended judgment.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 1, p. 240 (emphasis added). As the italicized
language indicates, under the plain language of the amendment the time the
statute applies is upon entry of judgment after the probation violation has been
found. Likewise, the amended I.C. § 19-2603 provides:

When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a
condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 2, p. 240 (emphasis added).

Again, the

contemplated time-frame for the awarding of credit for time served is at the time
the court revoked the probation.
Nothing in the statutes as they existed or as amended suggests a
legislative intent to render illegal prior calculations of time served.

Rather, the

statutes evince a clear intent that the amendments should apply only to those
calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective.

In this

case the district court entered its order revoking probation on June 19, 2014, and
that order was not appealed. (R., p. 127.) Nothing in the amendments indicates
a legislative intent to render any part of that order retroactively illegal. Because
the amount of credit for time served was calculated before the amendments,
those amendments are simply irrelevant to this appeal.
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Taylor has failed

to

show that the amendments he invokes were in any

way applicable to legal proceedings concluded before the amendments were
passed and effective. He has therefore failed

to

show error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying the second motion to correct an illegal sentence.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2015.

Deputy Attorney Gen
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